The Islamization of the West Bank and Gaza

As governments in the Middle East continue to morph and mutate there is great interest throughout the area, and throughout the world, as to whether those mutating governments will become Islamic or if they will become secular in nature. “Islamism is likely to dominate the political discourse in Muslim lands for the foreseeable future.” (Ruthven) Islamism is the belief that the laws and tenets of Islam found in the Koran and the Hadith, known as Shari’a Law, should be the law of the land, and that all governments should only govern according to that law. It is a belief that Allah is sovereign, and therefore his word should rule all people both at a personal and broad political level.  Those who support Islamism, or political Islam, stand in contrast with national secular governments like the one found in Turkey.

While many believe the idea of widespread Arab nationalism died with the pan-Arabic defeat in the 1967 Six Day war, there are many others who believe the future of Islam lies in individual families not in political aspirations. This is the belief of Malise Ruthven, author of Islam, A Very Short Introduction. He said, “for all the protestations to the contrary, the faith will be internalized.” (Ruthven) The very nature of Shari’a Law is private and centers on the family, and with the pressures of globalization and westernization facing the Middle East, the privatization of Islam will be a natural step to take.

In sharp contrast to Ruthven’s hypothesis is the hypothesis of Michael Roskin and James Coyle in their book Politics of the Middle East: Cultures and Conflicts. They believe that the politicization of Islam is not only inevitable, but that it will happen rapidly as well. Even the spread of democracy through the Middle East will lead to political Islam. “When a Middle Eastern regime opens the door even a crack to democracy, the first parties through it will be politicized forms of Islam.”(Roskin) Which then is the correct of these competing theories? The question must be carefully considered for it will determine much in the way of western relations with Middle Eastern governments for years to come.

Trying to determine the future of government in the Middle East is problematic because each country has a different story and different goals. This essay will focus on the trends within the West Bank and the Palestinian government as they struggle for statehood against Israel.  By looking at the trends of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Fatah, the dominant party within the PLO, and by looking at the broader political struggle  between Fatah and Hamas it will shed some light on the future of government and Islamism in that area. Have actions taken by Fatah during the Second Intifada been proof that this nationalist organization is abandoning its secular ideologies, or does it remain nationalist at its core? Is the 2006 electoral success of the Islamic Hamas over Fatah proof that Roskin and Coyle were correct, or was it an isolated incident?

Fatah was created in the early 1950s. During the war between Arab nations such as Egypt and Jordan on one side and Israel on the other, millions of Palestinians were expulsed from the Holy Land. The defeat of the Arab countries caused many of these refugees to stay in places like Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. Today there are over one hundred million of these refugees. During these first years in extreme poverty these Arab refugees began revolutionary movements to establish a Palestinian State. The most important organization to come out of these movements was Fatah. (Sayigh) Fatah was seen from the beginning as a secular political party created with the goal of finding a Palestinian State. In 1964 the PLO was created by the Arab League to continue the struggle against Israel, and Fatah became the major party within the PLO. (Turner)

It wasn’t until the late 1960s when Fatah came into a position of power within the PLO. During the 1960s most believed that the way to regain land from Israel and create a Palestinian State was through a pan-Arabic alliance between several Middle Eastern nations, most notably Egypt. This pan-Arabic movement culminated in what is now known as the Six Day War in June 1967. During the war the pan-Arabic countries suffered a humiliating defeat. Israeli air and ground forces dominated the campaign leaving the Arabs confused and humiliated. Most Muslims saw the Arabic defeat as a punishment from Allah for abandoning key tenants of Islam, and many demanded a change back to an Islamic controlled state. The war gave birth to many Jihadi movements and played a large role in the creation of groups like Al-Qaeda.  On the other hand however, even before the 1967 conflict Fatah had its priority on liberating the homeland through independent armed struggle.  Though some “interpreted Israel’s victory [in the Six Day War] as a sign that God was punishing Muslims for abandoning Islam … most Palestinians responded by embracing Fatah’s program of self-reliant armed struggle.” ( Lybarger, Pg. 3)

Though Fatah began as a nationalist party westerners have to understand that they were never secular in a way that we would think. In fact, “ideologically, neither Fatah (nor its leadership within the PLO) employed the term secular in public discourses.” (Frisch) Many Islamists who did not agree with Fatah’s political organization still agreed with their struggle against Israel. Some Islamists claimed they fought under the guise of Fatah during the time after the 1967 war. In fact, up until recently most of the Fatah leadership governed from outside Palestine, and there is strong evidence that many of these leaders were part of the Muslim Brotherhood. This was the same brotherhood who planned and carried out the assassination of Anwar Al Sadat, the third president of Egypt, for his work with the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty. (Robinson pg. 161) Even Fatah’s name has religious connotations. Fatah means “conquest” and is used almost always in the context of the early conquests of Islam.  Terms such as jihad, mujahideen, and fedayeen have regularly appeared in Fatah manifestos. (Frisch)  Fatah has always focused primarily on its struggle with Israel and has delayed major discussion of the characteristics of Palestinian society until liberation. It is still unsure what a sovereign regime ran by Fatah in the West Bank and Gaza would have looked like, and how secular it really would have been.

Westerners also shouldn’t look at Fatah secularism as being more peaceful than Islamist movements. Armed struggle has always been at the heart of Fatah’s ideology. The promotion of armed struggle “enabled Fatah to mobilize the masses in the absence of a solid ideology among the divided and faction-ridden Palestinian society.” (Zelkovitz) Much of this armed struggle has involved terrorism. Terrorism is often portrayed as being closely associated with religious extremism, but such associations were very different before the 1980s. Fatah has been involved in its fair share of terrorist activity. It wasn’t until 1988 when Fatah renounced terrorism and was taken off the U.S. terrorist organization list. There have been numerous militaristic branches of Fatah involved in terrorist activity. The most famous of these branches was Black September.  Black September was named after the events that took place in September 1970 when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine hijacked four passenger planes and took them to Jordan holding hostages for several days in an attempt to gain the world’s attention. The Black September organization lasted from 1971 to 1973 and was most famous for murdering eleven Israeli Olympians and two U.S. diplomats in 1972. Most of Fatah’s terrorist activity ended with the Yom Kippur War. The peace settlement between Egypt and Israel made Palestinian terrorism lose its strategic coherence.  (Ensalaco)

If we are to look at the terrorist activity of Fatah to determine if it is becoming Islamic we must distinguish the motives for terrorism during the 1970s from the motives forged in the 1980s. There is no reason to believe that the terror strategy pursued by Black September had any Islamic origins. The terror was committed with specific secular pursuits in mind, but by the end of the 1970s events in the Middle East changed the face of terrorism in that region, changes that persist until today. “The Islamic Revolution in Iran at the beginning of 1979 and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of that year marked the transmutation of terror.  Although secular Palestinian organizations continued to commit random acts of terror, militant Islam replaced Palestinian nationalism as the most dangerous inspiration for terror.” (Ensalaco)  We must look at the terrorist tactics of the military branches of Fatah during the and after 2000 in the light of this transmutated state of terrorism.

The actions of Fatah during the First Intifada can also be revealing when compared with their actions during the Second Intifada or the Al-Aqsa Intifada.  In comparison, the First Intifada, or struggle against Israel, was much more peaceful than the Second.  The First had about 1,400 casualties (only 75 were Israeli) while the Second had over 3,500. The First Intifada “did not call for the killing of Israelis. Actions were only focused on objects, not on human beings.” (Den Boer) Any real violent action taken against Israel was against soldiers or settlers, not Israeli citizens.

The First Intifada is however, when Fatah factions began emerging which, in the end, became very Islamic in nature. The Fatah Hawks are a prime example. The Hawks were a group created to fight against Israel in the Gaza Strip as well as fight against Hamas activists. “The Hawks, who had earlier represented themselves as a national element fighting against the extreme Islamist movement, today boast that, upon ‘God’s great name,’ they  ‘will protect the beautiful Islamic land of Palestine.” (Zelkovitz)  The Hawks now often speak of the Arabic and Islamic people, tying Fatah to a greater struggle than just the land of the West Bank.

The First Intifada ended in 1993 with the Oslo Accords. Under the Accords Fatah and the PLO stayed at peace with Israel for eight years until the peace process at Camp David failed leading to the next Intifada or the Al-Aqsa Intifada starting in 2000.  During these eight years Fatah was still seen as being nationalist. Yasser Arafat was even quoted as saying that Palestinians should put Christians before Muslims, yet even at this time things were changing. While Arafat praised nationalism and secularism many of his speeches at the time were “replete with quotes from the Koran, religious terms and symbols, and occasionally oral teachings imputed to Muhammad.” (Frisch)  Between 1994 and 2001 Arafat quoted verses from the Koran an average of four times a speech, and the verses were designed to present the overall framework of each speech. Arafat would also open each speech with the salutation “In the name of Allah, the Merciful and Compassionate,” and would end each speech with the salutation “Verily the great God speaks the Truth, peace and Allah’s compassion be upon you as well as his blessings.” (Frisch)

Official documents released by Fatah during this time also reflect a move towards a more Islamic stance. The document Strategic Moves, which still appears on their website, ends saying that Fatah is justified in their struggle against Israel because the land is “the third of the noble holy places, which Allah blessed around it. He blessed all of Palestine from the river to the sea, from the sea to victory.” (Fatah)  All of this helps to explain a public opinion survey taken in Palestine between November 1997 and March 1999. The survey revealed that “87.6 percent of Fatah supporters believed Islam should play a major role in the future life of Palestinian society.” (Zelkovitz) All of this led up to the year 2000 and the beginning of the Second Intifada.

By the year 2000 Fatah had at least three major challenges facing it. First, Fatah was now in major competition with Hamas who was making great use of Islam and Islamic symbols in its recruiting. Second, Fatah was facing an external enemy, Israel, who was technologically superior in every way, and Fatah needed a weapon to balance the fight. Third, Fatah was facing major factionalization which could have led to its destruction. (Zelkovitz) Adopting a more Islamic stance would help Fatah in all of these areas of struggle. It would allow Fatah to fuse Islamic and national symbols to compete with Hamas. It would provide a counterweight to Israel’s superior technology, and it could be the glue to overcome the factionalization.  Fatah used Islamic motifs to start up the Al-Aqsa Intifada. Even the name of the conflict was derived from a belief that Israel was going to destroy the Al-Aqsa mosque. Arafat almost inadvertently made the war one of Islam versus Judaism instead of Palestine versus Israel. “It was natural for Fatah to alter its own character to suit the rhetoric that had launched the conflict and kept it going.” (Shahar)

Fatah’s move to a more Islamic stance during the Second Intifada is most apparent in the actions of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.  In a 2004 Israeli raid of Yasser Arafat’s headquarters the military found several documents linking Fatah funds to Al-Aqsa operations. “The document was the first direct proof of what the Israeli intelligence establishment [had] claimed for some time: the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades [were] not a ‘rogue militia’ as Arafat [claimed]. Rather its members [were] on the Palestinian Authority’s payroll, its activities [were] financed out of Palestinian Authority coffers, and its attacks [were] carried out with the knowledge and backing of Yasser Arafat’s inner circle.” (Shahar)

Compared to all other stances Fatah has taken in the past, the actions of the Al-Aqsa Brigades from 2000 to 2005 were far more Islamic than anything seen before.  “Even the Arab Palestinian ‘nationalist’ press within Israel, which usually downplays the religious overtones of the conflict, had to report that the chants heard during the riots and demonstrations were mostly religious in nature.” (Frisch)The use of Islamic symbols by the Al-Aqsa Brigades and its factions, including the Hawks, was rampant. Most of the flags used by the groups were wrought with Islamic and Nationalist symbols.  Many flags had a shield with a black and white checkered background, which was a symbol for Fatah. In the foreground they would have the Dome of the Rock with a map of Palestine in Islamic green coming out of the top of the dome. This was symbolic of Muhammad’s night assent from this location. The flags would usually quote whole verses of the Koran at the top. (Zelkovitz) Even much of the graffiti of the Al-Aqsa members was Islamic. For example, one said, “Allah is my Lord; Islam is my faith; the Koran is my book; to the Kaba, I turn in prayer; Muhammad is my prophet; Fatah is my movement.” (Zelkovitz)

Some of the most shocking of the actions of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades were their wide use of suicide bombing as an act of terrorism. It was this bombing which convinced the U.S. to put the group on the list of terrorist organizations. The brigade committed more than half of the suicide bombings in Israel in 2002. (Moghadam, Pg. 82) This more than anything painted the Brigades in an Islamist light. Many of the obituary notes of the bombers were very religious. One condemned “the enemies of God, the Jews, the pigs Sharon and his government and gang of murderous gangsters who with the support of the apex of apostasy, America, carry out the most heinous of crimes.”(Frisch) Such acts of terrorism have, since the 1980s, been closely associated with Islamism, and to see a nationalist organization utilizing such tactics casts major doubts on that organization’s secularism.

Fatah’s support of the Al-Aqsa Brigades is coupled with the fact that it allowed Hamas and Islamic-Jihad to operate during the Intifada. If Fatah had wanted to it could have shut the groups down, but it let them rise. These facts clearly show that Fatah is becoming more Islamic. There have always been Islamic undertones in Fatah, but its use of Islamic terrorism and rampant use of Islamic symbols shows that Fatah will at least use Islam more readily to rally the people than it ever did in the past.

Despite all the evidence to the contrary, Fatah remains a nationalistic party at its core. It has never officially changed its stance. However, though Fatah still remains nationalist its use of nationalism is very different today than it was at its conception. Fatah’s reasons for remaining secular may be more for international relations than anything else. They understand that they have significant leverage with American and European Countries, especially after September 11, by remaining secular. They understand that “the international system will respond more affirmatively to nationalist rather than to religious movements.” (Frisch) Fatah remains nationalist to appease outsiders, but uses Islamism to rally insiders. It is hard to understand which stance really carries the party’s ideology and which one is a tool to increase power anymore, but regardless of the truth, the events of the past few decades make it hard to say that Islamism will become private in nature any time soon in Palestine. Things seem to be moving steadily in the other direction as far as the internal changes of Fatah are concerned.

Though Fatah is more Islamic today it is still far more nationalistic than Hamas will ever be.  “Whereas for Fatah, Islam is basically a means, for Hamas the Islamic normative order and collective boundary is an end they aspire to realize.” (Frisch) To understand the true Islamization of Palestine we have to look at the political struggle between Fatah and Hamas. There is no better place to look than the 2006 elections between Fatah and Hamas.

Hamas was created by a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 as part of the First Intifada. Unlike Fatah, Hamas committed much of the violence during the Intifada using explosives and Molotov Cocktails.  (Den Boer) Hamas is an extremist Islamic group which has wanted to impose Shari’a Law in Palestine, and has wanted to wipe out Israel. It is on the US list of terrorist organizations and was one of the first groups in the area to make use of suicide bombs. (Turner) Hamas began to gain wide support from the people during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, but was unable to compete in popularity with Fatah or the PLO until 2006. (Shahar)

To understand the importance of the 2006 elections between Fatah and Hamas it is first important to understand the history of democracy in the West Bank and Gaza. This history begins with the Oslo Accords in 1993. The Oslo Accords was the peace process between Israel and the PLO which ended the First Intifada. One of the biggest changes the Accords brought to the West Bank and Gaza was the creation of the Palestinian Authority or the PA. The PA was designed to be an interim administration in preparation for full sovereignty.  It is a hybrid political organization incorporating self-rule into continued occupation.  The Accords failed by 2000, but the PA has remained in place. Although the formal attributes of democracy were in place within the PA including a president and parliament “the main problem with the PA was that it was not set up to deliver democracy to the Palestinians, but to deliver security to Israel.” (Turner) Democracy was unlikely to be achieved under Oslo because it facilitated one-party rule with a centralized system of power. The parliament, known as the PLC, had very little power. Hamas rejected Oslo and challenged the PA.

The stance on democracy in West Bank Gaza (WBG) changed in 2002 with the introduction of the Roadmap strategy sponsored by the US the EU the UN and Russia. (CFR)  The Roadmap based much of its strategy on a theory known as the Liberal Peace Theory which says that no two working democracies go to war with each other. The Bush Administration believed that promoting democracy would create the peace Oslo didn’t.  “The logic of Oslo had been peace now, democracy later. This had failed. The logic of the Roadmap was democracy now peace later.” (Brown)

The introduction of the Roadmap Strategy, the death of Yasser Arafat in 2004, and the growing popularity of Hamas made Hamas start considering becoming part of the political process by 2005. “Hamas which in fact is a radical Islamic organization, far removed from values of democracy, has adopted the democratic argument and claims that from now on, it is the representative of the Palestinian people.” (Fighel) Hamas could take control of the PLC without having to negotiate with Israel. The 2006 elections then, became the first truly free elections in WBG history with a secular nationalist party facing off against an Islamist party. The US and the UN funded the elections. “The US accepted the participation of Hamas, having been led to believe … that there would be a Fatah victory that would undermine the Islamic challenge in the region.” (Turner) Both Israel and the US believed the Liberal Peace Theory, and were confident the election would dissipate the growing power of Hamas.

The U.S. and Israel ended up being wrong. The Islamist and more violent Hamas took 76 of 132 seats in the PLC while Fatah took only 43. (Washington Post) The repercussions of the election were brutal.  A Hamas parliament and a Fatah president caused a stalemate in government. The reaction of Israel and the U.S. practically placed a siege on the territory. The election led WBG into economic turmoil on a grand scale. It also hurt the peace process between Israel and Palestine immensely. (Heller) This victory, which was shocking to the US, brought an extreme Islamist group intent on applying Shari’a Law into a position of power. The outcome of the elections seems to bring chilling legitimacy to Roskin and Coyle’s claim that “when a Middle Eastern regime opens the door even a crack to democracy, the first parties through it will be politicized forms of Islam.”(Roskin)

Though the result of the elections seems to be a wholesale victory for political Islam, it might not be as big of a victory as it first appears when we take a closer look. “While religion was indeed a factor, it was not a decisive one. In no way can the vote for Hamas be interpreted as a vote for Islam.”  (Shikaki) The party had a wide appeal to all religious backgrounds. It gained 38 percent of the somewhat religious vote, and 19 percent of the nonreligious.  “Only slightly more than a third of Palestinians surveyed deemed the vote for Hamas to be a vote for an Islamist-style PA that would rule according to Shari’a.” Forty percent of those who did believe that voted for Fatah. (Shikaki) So, why did Hamas win?

Through the time of the Oslo Accords and Second Intifada Palestine was in economic turmoil. Much of this was due to the tight sanctions Israel placed on the area. By 2006 the peace process was stagnant, and there were increasing amounts of crime in the area. Fatah was blamed for all these problems. Their popularity had gone down immensely.  (Turner)  Also, by 2006 the organization was in extreme disarray.  Its armed militias were attacking each other constantly. They were politically unorganized. In many districts Fatah would run several candidates to Hamas’ one.  Hamas presented an answer to all of this. “To the outside world, Hamas is most commonly associated with violence and the suicide bomber, but within the WBG it is known for its extensive social services network.” (Turner) This follows many other extremist groups in the Middle East such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hezbollah in Lebanon. “What most damaged Fatah’s chances was the voters’ belief that corruption and lawlessness were key problems that Hamas would do a better job of fixing.” (Shikaki) Hamas was well disciplined and well organized. They “had a clear advantage in that [they] could show a level of success in municipal government. Fatah, on the other hand, was at a disadvantage in having to defend its record in government … Hamas could thus present itself as the party of discipline and charity, not something which Fatah could easily claim.” (Turner)

Hamas won the election because the Palestinian people were disenchanted with the current party. Today the two parties are geographically split. Fatah controls the West Bank while Hamas controls Gaza. Both parties are very weak and don’t have the backing of the people. The president of the PA Mahmoud Abbas, the highest representative of Fatah, will not be running for reelection.  He depends on Israel to support him and only has a 12 percent approval rate. (Jerusalem Post) Hamas is even less popular than Fatah or Abbas. (Khalidi) The people have grown disenchanted with both parties, as they were with Fatah in 2006, and are ready to adopt a more promising party into power, as they did with Hamas in 2006. It will matter little if the new party of power is Islamist or secular. The people have more immediate cares than those ideological concerns.

After reviewing the state of Fatah and Hamas in WBG it is not apparent that Rothven was right. Islamism does not seem to be reverting back to a private state any time in the near future. However, it also doesn’t appear that Roskin was right. WBG doesn’t seem to be leaping towards Islamism. It is true that Fatah is not the same secular party that it was in the past. Its actions during the Second Intifada suggest that it is adopting a more Islamist stance. Though Fatah has always had a connection to Islam, the connection has grown since the 1990s. Evidence suggests however, that this move was made simply for practical purposes such as motivating the people, not ideological ones. It shows that though the people are more Islamic minded than they were in the 1970s, the party itself might not be.

The 2006 elections also add suspicion to Rothven’s claim. Though the western powers thought that Fatah would win, in the end Islamist Hamas won.  However, the people did not put Hamas in power because Hamas was Islamist, but because they were disenchanted with Fatah, and Hamas offered a hope of better governance. It is not quite as Roskin says because a more trusting secular party could come along and easily take power away from Hamas in open elections.

In conclusion, the future of Islamism in WBG seems to lie somewhere in-between both theories. Politics are moving more towards an Islamist state, but it is slower than expected. Any changes with relations to Israel, or some internal political uprising could easily change that flow. The moves towards Islamism seem not to be coming from ideology, but from changing circumstances. If the US and other western powers wish to dissipate the power of extremist Islamist groups they need to take these changing circumstances into account as they work with existing governments.

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